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TRUSTS; CHARITIES; DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARIES. In
Staines v. Burton et al, 53 Pac. 1015 (July 14, 1898), the
Supreme Court of Utah was afforded an occasion to decide upon
the question of what constitutes a charity. In that case the testator
had given certain life estates, with remainders as follows: "After
the death of each one, I desire that my executors shall make over
to the presiding bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints the half- of my estate, etc. The presiding bishop shall
receive it in trust, to expend the annual interest or income, accord-
ing to his discretion, for the benefit of the members of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, whether it be for schools, parks,
watering cities, planting forests, acclimatizing foreign plants, or
anything else whereby the members may be benefited." The court
held that the beneficiaries were sufficiently described, and being
for lawful purposes, the trust would be sustained.
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NOTES.
The court, speaking through Zane, C. J., referring to the objects
of the trust, says: "The terms of the trust did not require the
trustee to aid all of them. He might devote all of the income to
schools or parks, or to either or any of them, if, in his judgment,
by so doing, the members of the church would be benefited most."
And it was held that the purposes pointed out were charities within
the legal meaning of that word, and whatever discretion was
allowed the trustee must be exercised either in favor of the purposes
enumerated or others of like nature.
No definition of a charity is attempted by the court but the
one suggested by Lord Camden is approved. Lord Camden's
definition is, "a gift to a general public use, which extends to the
poor as well as to the rich." Jones v. Willians, Ambler, 652
(1767). It is suggested in the opinion that the Statute 43 Eliz.
c. 4, is admitted to be the principal test of what are in law
charitable uses. That this statute was not the origin of charitable
uses, is conclusively shown in idal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How.
(U. S.) 128 (1844). It is, nevertheless, generally adopted by
the courts as a guiding star in determining what are charities:
Bispham's Equity (5th Ed.), § 1I9.
As a general rule, where the purposes are not sufficiently outlined,
but left rather to the discretion of the trustee, there the trust fails
for uncertainty: Aforice v. Bishop of.Durham, 9 Ves. 404 (1804);
Livesei' v. lones, 35 Atl. (N. J.) lO64 (1896). But if the
purposes are specified even in general terms, and those purposes are
charitable, the discretion of the trustee will be controlled to the
extent of confining the gift to charities, and the trust will be
sustained as in the principal case. The aim of the courts is to
ascertain the intention of the creator of the trust. If it be to
establish a charity, whether eo noinine, or in substance, and be
sufficiently indicated, it will be enforced: S/aines v. Buron,.supra;
Parish of Christ Church v. Trustees, Etc., 67 Conn. 554 (1896);
Dy'e v. Beaver Creek Church, 26 S. E. 717 (S. C.) (I896) ; lit
re Daring [1896], 1 Ch. So ; In re .Macduff [1896], 2 Ch. 451.
Gifts for the relief of the poor of, or for the relief of members of
churches or societies are held to be charitable uses: Staines v.
Burton, suira; Evang'elical Association's Appeal, 35 Pa. 316
(i86o); Gonklin v. .Davis, 63 Conn. 377 (1893) ; Aft'y-Gen'l
v. Old South SocieO', 13 Allen (Mass.), 474 (1866); Duke v.
-Puller, 9 N. H. 536 (1838).
RELATION OF INNKEEPER AND GUEST; HOTEL; WHAT CONSTITUTE,
A "IGUEST." In Orchard v. Bush [1898], 2 Q. B. 284, Wills, J.,
of the Queen's Bench Division, gives an interesting discussion of
the conditions necessary to constitute the relation of innkeeper
and guest, so as to impose upon the host that special liability
which the law has attached to innkeepers. Plaintiff, who lived
just outside of Liverpool and was about to return to his home
from the town, went to a large Liverpool hotel for supper. A
NOTES.
considerable portion of the hotel's business consisted in the fur-
nishing of meals without sleeping rooms. Plaintiff placed his
overcoat in the part of the room where they were ordinarily kept,
and, having left the room to speak to the proprietor, returned to
find his coat stolen.
On suit against the proprietor of the hotel it was contended for
the defence that the relation of innkeeper and guest did not exist,
on the ground that plaintiff was not a "traveller" and that his
purpose was not to make use of the hotel in its character as an inn,
but merely as a restaurant. The Queen's Bench Division, how-
ever, thought that proprietor was liable as an innkeeper, Wills, J.,
saying:
"Taking the narrower view, contended for by counsel for the
defendant, of what is a guest, I fail to understand in what sense
he was not a guest. The room he went into was the dining-room
of the hotel. It is said that, in order to make him a guest, he
must be a wayfarer and traveller. The facts are that he was on
his way home; he was on his way to the station, by which he
travelled home by railway. Why was he not a wayfarer? If he
had been riding to his home on horseback along a country road,
and between the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem he used
an inn for the purpose of getting food for himself and his horse,
he clearly would be a wayfarer and a guest at the inn. What dif-
ference does it make that he was not riding-as 1oo years ago he
probably would have been-but that he was walking to the railway
station in order to take the train, and on the way called at an inn,
and was received there and served with such refreshment as he re-
quir'd? But I do not take the more restricted view of what con-
stitutes a guest at an inn. I think a guest is a person who uses the
inn, either for a temporary or a more permanent stay, in order to
take what the inn can give."
It is well settled that, in order to entitle one to the common
law rights and privileges of a guest, he must be a "traveller:"
Ca/ye's Case, 8 Co. 31 (1684) ; Jfaini;ig v. TiNlIs, 9 Humph.
(Tenn.) 746 (1849) ; -Xeal v. IWilcox1, 4 Jones. Law (N. C.), 146
(x8S6). In early times a - traveller" must have come from a
distance, since "if a neighbor, who is no traveller, as a friend,
at the request of the innholder lodges there, and his goods be
stolen, etc., he shall not have an action; for the writ is ad hs-
pitanlos homines, etc., trattscit/zies, in eisdemn, hospitantes," et,.
Cal'e's Case, supra, Dyer, 26, pl. 9. Modern cases, however,
hold that it is not necessary that the guest should have come from
a distance. A neighbor may be a guest as well as a person who
comes from a foreign country: IH1tcr,;mte v. Clark, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.)
242 (x851) ; T!'aZ /n# v. Poler, 35 Conn. 183 (i868) ; Cirtiss v.
iAJfuip/, 63 Wis. 6 (1885). However, if the traveller comes to
the inn for an immoral purpose, such as that of prostitution, the
relationship does not exist, since the proprietor would be justified
in refusing admission : Cur/iss v.. -lftpI, supra.
NOTES.
Guests are those only who make use of the inn for the ordinary
pu;rposes of rest and refreshment. Thus, a man who takes a room
at an inn for the purpose of displaying clocks and watches for
sale, is not a guest: Biutess v. Clemnents, 4 M. & S. 306 (1815);
nor is one who makes use of the inn as a mere depository for his
valuables: Arcade Co. v. Ir 7/1, 44 Ohio St. 32 (186). It has
been held that the mere fact that a traveller leaves his horse at an
inn is sufficient to render him a guest, even though he may lodge
in another place; Jtson v. T/woxmjson, 9 Pick. 280 (1830) - Peet v.
.ilCraw;,, 25 Wend. 653 (i841); fcDalniells v. -Robinson, 26 Vt.
316 (1854). But this position has been denied : Grinnellv. Cool
3 Hill, 485 (1842); 2Thickstum v.,-.kard, 8 Blachf. (Ind.) 535
(1847) ; H-lickman v. To,'as, 16 Ala. 666 (1849). See note to
A1 ffniels v. Robinson, sz:,4ra, where an attempt is made to re-
concile the cases. There is authority for the proposition that a
person who comes to an inn for the purpose merely of drinking a
glass of liquor, is a guest: Benne/v. .Jellor, 5 T. R. 273 (1793)
A/cDonahtv. dger/on, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 560 (1849); but in the
interpretation of the liquor statute of Massachusetts the contrary
was held: Comm. v. _R'g'n, 140 Mass. 289 (1885); G111. v.
,.A,,re, 145 Mass. 244 (1887). Certainly such a person would be
a guest under the dictum in Crchard v. Butsi, stfam, that 'A guest
is a person who uses the inn either for a temporary or a more
permanent stay, in order to take what the inn can give."
The special relationship of innkeeper and guest extends only to
those persons whose stay is indefinite, and who are entertained
from day to day under an implied contract. If there is an express
contract to pay a certain rate for a certain time, the lodger is not a
guest, but a boarder, and the special liability ceases. The proprietor
of the house may be both an innkeeper and a boarding-house keeper;
Je,Fordts v. Crun1y, 12 Phila. 500 (1877) ; Ilance v. Thi-ockmorton,
5 Bush (Ky.), 41 (i868) ; Jfanail v. U1i/s, 9 Humph. 746
(1849) ; Jfoore v. Long Beact Co., 87 Cal. 483 (1891). But if a
person comes to an inn in the character of a guest, the mere fixing
of the time and price does not of itself disturb the relationship
and cause the guest to become a boarder: Berks/:ie Co, v. P/, ,/or,
7 Cush. 417 (I851) ; fcDaniells v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316 (854);
.A'orcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (i866) ; Pinker/ton v. TNfod-
ward, 33 Cal. 596 (1867); .- ai v. Pike, 1oo Mass. 495 (1868);
Pe ,7ck v. Zamldis, 36 Iowa, 651 (1873); .a/ie v. Gardinal, 35
Wise, 118 (1874); Luskv. Belole, 22 Minn. 468 (1876) ; Fay
v. inirovenient Co., 28 Pac. (Cal.) 943 (1892). But there are
authorities to the contrary, and the fact that a special rate has been
fixed for a certain time is strong evidence thatithe lodger is a
boarder; flace v. Throcknmor/on, 5 Bush. 41 (1868); -firsh v.
Byers, 29 Mo. 469 (i86o). An army or navy officer, who has
no fixed home but spends his time at hotels, is a guest: Rancock
v. Ra1d, 94 N. Y. (1883); but a railroad conductor, who stops at
a hotel located at the termiuus of each of his trips, is a boarder:
Ziornerv. Harvey, 3 N. Mex. 307 (884).
NOTES.
A mere restaurant keeper is not burdened with an innkeeper's
liability toward those who take their meals at his restaurant : Doe
v. Lansin, 4 Campb. 77 (1814) ; People v. Jones, 54 Barb. (N.
Y.) 316 (1883) ; Caupenter v. Taylor, i Hilt. (N. Y.) 193
(1856) ; Bonner v. 1 e/born, 7 Ga. 296 (1849) ; Lewis v. Hitch-
cock, 1o Fed. 4 (1882) ; TWelten v. -Nicholls [1894], 1 Q. B. 92;
Schou/er, Bainents, 252 ; nor is even an innkeeper, if the res-
taurant is located apart from the inn: Reg v. R'mer, 2 Q. B. D.
136 (1877). In Gasenhofer v. Clair, io Daly (N. Y.), 265
(1881), a person who took dinner at an inn was held not to be a
guest, on the peculiar theory that there was no contract with the
innkeeper, se, contra : Orchard v. Bush, sulra.
The question has often arisen whether the relation of innkeeper
and guest exists between a sleeping car company and a passenger
on the car. In Pull. Pal. Car Co. v. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239 (1889),
it was held that the sleeping car company was an innkeeper in re-
spect to the passengers' baggage, but the present weight of author-
ity is to the contrary: Carpenter v. R. R., 124 N. Y. 53 (1891) ;
WVoodruff Sleep5. Car Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474 (1882) ; -Pull. Pal.
Car Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53 (1893); Pull. Pal. Car Co. v.
Smith, 73 Ill. 360 (1894). See 37 Ara. LAw REGISTER (N. S.),
264.
